SEASONABLE HINTS

FROM AN

HONEST MAN

ON THE PRESENT IMPORTANT CRISIS OF A

NEW REIGN

AND A

NEW PARLIAMENT.

Mihi indies magis animus accenditur cum conſidero quæ conditio vitæ futura ſit, niſi noſmetipſos *vindicamus in libertatem*; nam, poſtquam Reſp. in *paucorum potentium* jus atque ditionem conceſſit, ſemper illis *Reges* — vectigales eſſe — cæteri omnes, ſtrenui, boni, nobiles, atque ignobiles, vulgus fuimus, ſine gratia, ſine auctoritate, his obnoxii quibus, ſi *Reſpub. valeret*, formidini eſſemus. SALLUST.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

SEASONABLE HINTS

FROM AN

HONEST MAN.

THERE is ſcarcely an individual in the nation, whoſe thoughts have not full employment given to them by the acceſſion of a new monarch to the crown. The loweſt as well as the higheſt ranks in the community, look upon themſelves as intereſted in the great event. Our tradeſmen and manufacturers view it as promoting or checking the profits of their reſpective branches of commerce and occupations. Others again, who join idleneſs to affluence, are fond of the proſpect of a new reign, merely as it will open new ſcenes to gratify their gaping curioſity. Even the fair ſex find themſelves deeply concerned in the important criſis; and, perhaps, are puzzled, whether they have moſt reaſon to lament the ſable uniformity of dreſs to which they are doomed; or to rejoice, that they have been already entertained with the melancholy ſplendor of a royal funeral, and are ſoon to be feaſted with the pompous ſhow of a coronation.——If we ſtep into the political world, the agitation and hurry increaſes; the hopes and fears of every one, who looks upon himſelf as connected with government, are all afloat; ambition is at work in every corner; and from the ſervile attendant in the drawing-room, to the ſtately miniſter in the council chamber, we find nothing but the eagerneſs of expectation, or the apprehenſions of diſappointment, painted in every face.

Amidſt this ſtrange tumult of buſineſs and of idleneſs, of condolence and congratulation, though I am too inconſiderable a member of the community, to think I have any right to mix as an actor, on the theatre of public life; at the ſame time, I have ſo much vanity as to think myſelf conſiderable enough to be indulged in giving my ſentiments how I could wiſh others may act. Not biaſſed by the prejudices of party; neither afraid of loſing a place, nor hoping to gain one, I feel myſelf impelled, almoſt irreſiſtibly, in the infancy of his majeſty's government, to throw into the hands of the public, with all the decency and moderation of the moſt loyal ſubject, yet with all the freedom and impartiality of the warmeſt patriot, ſome thoughts that have occurred to me on this moſt important occaſion. If I can ſuggeſt any thing that may co-incide with the ſentiments of thoſe who have power to carry my honeſt wiſhes into execution, I ſhall think myſelf amply rewarded; if I fail in this, I ſhall ſtill hope that my readers, though they may call in queſtion my abilities as a writer, will, at the ſame time, do juſtice to my zeal as an *Engliſhman*; and, at leaſt, look upon this, my firſt, and I believe laſt attempt, as an author, to be a proof of my ſincere attachment to his majeſty's perſon and government; and dictated from a heart that pants with an ardent zeal to ſee *him* great, and his people *happy*.

Happy as it was, that providence extended the life of his late majeſty, till a ſucceſſor arrived at an age that ſpurns the fetters of a *regency*, and delivers the nation from the confuſion incident to a minority; it is ſtill greatly to be lamented, that his reign was not prolonged till he had compoſed that ferment which now rages throughout Europe; that ſo he might leave no other care to his royal grandſon, but the eaſy and pleaſing one of bleſſing his ſubjects, by cultivating the arts of foreign and domeſtic peace. But alas! the acceſſion of his preſent majeſty hath happened

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at a buſy and perplexing criſis. He hath been forced to lay hold of the helm of ſtate, while the veſſel is ſtill toſt by a violent ſtorm; and, though not in danger of ſhipwreck, liable to many accidents before ſhe can be brought into a ſafe harbour.

But it is not my intention to enlarge upon the difficulties of this ſort, with which his majeſty begins his reign. With regard to the war, and our behaviour towards our allies, there can be but one path to walk in; and when the method of conduct is agreed upon, conſequences, however diſagreeable, will be leſs perplexing. Adherence to the ſame councils, by which the war hath hitherto been conducted, will ſtill, it is to be hoped, produce happy effects; and it muſt be left to time, and to circumſtances, to find out a proper means of reconciling the loſſes of our allies on the continent of Europe, with our own advantages in America; and of extricating them from the dangers that threaten their poſſeſſions, without ſacrificing our own conqueſts; conqueſts purchaſed at the expence of ſo many millions; which our enemies, we are certain, are unable to recover by force, and which therefore, cannot be loſt but by weak negotiations.

What principally hath given riſe to this my attempt as a writer, is my eagerneſs to expreſs, in the moſt public manner, my hopes and my wiſhes that, to the neceſſary difficulties, occaſioned by the war, under which his majeſty has mounted the throne, unneceſſary ones may not be ſupperadded, by the avarice or ambition of courtiers, by the claims and importunities of candidates for power and places; by the ſtruggle of parties, and the competition of factions, each aiming to be the monopolizers of the royal favor, and forcing themſelves, if they can, into employments.

I am very ſenſible of the great nicety of my ſubject, but I ſhall endeavour to treat it in ſuch a manner, that every friend of the conſtitution may be con-

vinced of the rectitude of my intentions, and own that I am not altogether unworthy to be looked upon as one of thoſe *honeſt men*, whoſe aſſiſtance his majeſty has called for from the throne.

Were it poſſible for me to be conveyed, for a few moments, to the cloſet, under the form of ſome *Mentor*, I ſhould think myſelf obliged by every dictate of loyalty, and every counſel of prudence, to recommend and enforce this moſt ſeaſonable piece of advice ;—to be upon the guard againſt the artful applications of every ſet of courtiers ; and by a proper firmneſs to convince every one that we have a monarch on the throne, who, knowing that he reigns in the hearts of an united people, is determined not to reſign himſelf, to the inſolent pretenſions of any confederacy of miniſters.

The importance and ſeaſonableneſs of ſuch advice is ſelf-evident. For if any ſuch confederacy ſhould be forming, or already formed (though I cannot ſuppoſe any body ſo weak, or ſo wicked as to engage in it) the manner in which it is treated, at its firſt appearance, will have very deciſive conſequences ; in ſhort, it will, in a great meaſure, determine, whether the prince upon the throne, is to reign over a free and united people, with that full extent of power which our well-poiſed government allows to the crown, or whether he is to content himſelf with the ſhadow of royalty, while a ſet of *undertakers* for his buſineſs, intercept his immediate communication with his people, and make uſe of the legal prerogatives of their *maſter*, to eſtabliſh the illegal claims of factious *oligarchy*.

It were no difficult taſk, perhaps, to draw a ridiculous enough picture of the groupes of candidates for court-favors, on ſuch occaſions as the preſent ; and to deſcribe with that ludicrous ſeverity which it deſerves, the inſatiable thirſt of thoſe who, though they have been intoxicated, for years, with the moſt copious draughts of the cup of power, are ſtill ſo unreaſonable

reaſonable as to be craving for more, to the utter excluſion of numbers, who have an equal right to taſte it in their turn. But the ſcramble for power and places, which of late years hath been, as it were, the great aim of almoſt every one who approached the throne, and which I ſo ardently wiſh may not revive at this juncture, is more the object of grave ſentiment than of giddy ridicule. We may laugh at the private foibles of the great, but cannot help being ſhocked at their public corruption. They are fit ſubjects for the poet's ſatire, when we view them confederating at a *horſe race*, or a *gaming table*; but of the patriot's indignation, when we conſider their conduct in *public life*, and obſerve their factious combinations to lay violent hands on every lucrative employment; true to their own mercenary concerns, but regardleſs of the national intereſt; devoted to ſome miniſter, at whoſe levee they bow with ſervility; and ſcarcely owning an obligation to the royal hand, which decency obliges them to kiſs.

It muſt give every lover of his country real ſatisfaction, that thoſe eminent counſellors, who adviſed and conducted the preſent war, are continued in employment at this time, that they may not be deprived of the opportunity of diſplaying their abilities, in extricating the nation out of thoſe difficulties and diſtreſſes, in which, during their counſels, it was firſt involved. But at the ſame time, I ſhould be ſorry to ſee any miniſter, or knot of miniſters, permitted to graſp univerſal influence in *domeſtic buſineſs*, and forcing his majeſty, at his firſt entrance upon government, to nominate to all the employments about his perſon, in his family, and in his revenues, not thoſe whom he himſelf thinks worthieſt and likes beſt, but thoſe whom the confederated Party-leaders may think moſt likely to be dependant on themſelves, and whom they may make uſe of as their inſtruments to extend their influence, nay, to perpetuate their power, in oppoſition to the royal inclination.

A king who would hope for a reign of conſequence, and eaſe, muſt begin with ſuch a ſteadineſs of conduct, as may convince every one who approaches him, that he knows it is the duty of his miniſters to depend on him, and has too much ſpirit to depend on his miniſters. If he ſhews his inclination to continue particular perſons in high office, he muſt at the ſame time, ſhew his reſolution to break all factious *connections* and *confederacies*.

A new king ſurrounded by a ſet of graſping courtiers, each aiming at the management of him, like a virgin beſet by her lovers, muſt, upon occaſion, be able to check their importunity, and ſteadily ſay, *No*. The judicious uſe of this ſhort, but expreſſive monoſyllable, will ſave a world of trouble, and be the only means of preſerving his future honor and dignity. But if once it be diſcovered, that he durſt not ſay this on one occaſion, his independence will, on every occaſion, be attacked, till, at laſt, by repeated compliances, he ſees himſelf doomed, through his whole reign to ſuffer violence from every one who ſhall have inſolence enough to make the attempt.

In a word, if a monarch do not begin his ſovereignty by ſuch a conduct, as will let the candidates for power ſee, that he will not permit them to force it from him, he will at laſt ſee himſelf the ſervant of his own ſervants; the fountain of all honors, without being able to beſtow any; with a right to diſpoſe of every office however great, without being allowed to name to any one of the loweſt; and if ever he ſhould endeavor to extricate himſelf out of this unhappy ſtate, he will then learn, by dear-bought experience, that it is much eaſier to preſerve independence, than to throw off ſubjection; and that one moment of ſteadineſs, at the beginning of his reign, would have ſaved him years of trouble and diſtreſs, in the progreſs of it.

Theſe reflections have too ſolid a foundation in ſound policy to be controverted in general; but the particular

particular application of them to the preſent ſtate of affairs in this country, will, I foreſee, meet with oppoſition. While they coincide with the ſentiments of every honeſt and independent perſon in the nation, they may perhaps be diſagreeable to certain individuals, who having long baſked themſelves in the warm ſunſhine of a court, may, at laſt, think they have a right to contract within their own narrow ſphere, every ſpark of that luminary of majeſty, which was intended to diffuſe light and heat, to the numerous and wide-extended objects capable of receiving its influence.——To talk of the independency of the crown, on its own ſervants, to ſuch perſons, will have the air of a new and dangerous doctrine; and we ſhall hear them, no doubt (concealing, with their uſual modeſty, their private views under the appearance of public virtue,) urge the neceſſity of the king's ſubmitting to give up the management of his affairs, and the excluſive diſpoſal of all his employments, to ſome miniſter, or ſet of miniſters, who, by uniting together, and backed by their numerous dependents, may be able to carry on the meaſures of government.

This ſtrange doctrine having been but too faſhionable of late years, and, in conſequence of it, confederated miniſters having but too frequently, in the former reigns, offered the moſt unwarrantable violence to majeſty, I ſhall think myſelf very laudably employed, if, without meaning to attack individuals for what is paſt, and ſtudious only to guard againſt what is wrong for the future, I offer ſome ſeaſonable reflections on this great and national ſubject.

It is uſed to be looked upon as the perfection of the *Engliſh* government, that the ſupreme power is divided between the three eſtates of the kingdom; but according to the doctrine of the above-mentioned monopolizers of places, the preſent diſtribution of power is a faulty one: and, in order to correct this fault,

fault, a cabal of miniſters muſt be allowed to erect themſelves into a fourth eſtate, to check, to controul, to influence, nay, to enſlave the other three. If the advocates for governing by ſuch a ſyſtem would ſpeak out, they muſt admit this to be the principle on which all their politics proceed; and when once they have been brought to own that it is their intention to annihilate every conſtitutional power in the Britiſh legiſlature, by the influence of a private unconſtitutional aſſociation of party leaders, we ſhall then have much the ſame ſort of eſteem for them, that we ſhould have for a confederacy of a few lawyers, who could have the modeſty to aſſert, that in order to carry on the buſineſs of Weſtminſter-Hall, as it ought to be, the whole of it ſhould paſs through their hands only, and they be allowed to bully the judges, and to bribe the juries into ſuch deciſions as they ſhall dictate.

If miniſters ſhould inſiſt, that none but their dependents muſt be put into employments, upon pretence that if thoſe employments be conferred on others, the juſt deſigns of the king will meet with oppoſition, what is this but to ſay, in other words, that private intereſt, avarice, or ambition, are the only motives that guide them in their conduct, with regard to the public; and that they will oppoſe thoſe very meaſures they now ſupport, unleſs they be allowed to pay themſelves for ſupporting them? Can there be any thing ſo unworthy of Engliſhmen, men of honor, and good ſubjects, as an open avowal of ſuch ſcandalous combinations, which appear to be formed upon this ſingle principle of ſerving the crown, only for their own convenience, and of oppoſing its meaſures, for every reaſon, but a conviction that they are wrong? Can there, therefore, be a lover of his country, who would not wiſh to ſee the prince upon the throne ſet all ſuch confederacies, if any ſhould ariſe, at defiance? And can there be the leaſt doubt, that the nation, in general, would

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liſt itſelf on his ſide, if any ſet of all-graſping courtiers ſhould have the inſolence to make attempts on his independence? The Engliſh are too ſober and ſenſible a people, to prefer the dark and arbitrary influence of *Ariſtocracy*, to the known legal claims of a limited *monarchy*. Their ſovereign therefore, will never want friends to ſtand by him, when the competition is not between prerogative and liberty, but between king and miniſters: and as a king in this country, will find *no party* ſtrong enough to ſupport his government, when once the body of the nation ſees him do wrong, ſo, on the other hand, if he does what is right, ſafe in the affections of a great and generous people, no faction need ever appear ſo formidable, in its influence and number of dependents, as to force him to give way to their inſolent attempts to perpetuate their power, in oppoſition to his inclination.

To hear ſome folks talk of the neceſſity the crown is under to ſubmit to the direction and management of confederated miniſters, one would imagine, that the times of the *old barons* were revived, when by their feudal ſuperiorities, military vaſſals, and numerous retainers, they could, at any time, if they united together, meaſure ſwords with their ſovereign: but thank God, thoſe times have been long at an end, and the great men of this country have no means of making themſelves conſiderable, and of procuring dependents, but ſuch as the crown furniſhes them with, by intruſting them with the direction of that influence which is its own, which may be reſumed at pleaſure, and which whenever it is reſumed, muſt leave the greateſt leader of a miniſterial confederacy, as inſignificant as he was before thought formidable. If there have been inſtances in modern times, that ſeem to contradict my aſſertion, this hath not ariſen from real power in the ſubject, but from weak timidity and ill judged compliance in the crown. An indolent maſter, who gives up the entire

entire management of his fortune to a favourite ſteward, permitting him, for a number of years, to appoint or to diſplace all his domeſtic ſervants, to raiſe their wages, or to grant them annuities out of the eſtate, without ever controuling his intentions, or calling him to account; ſuch a perſon as this, it is natural to ſuppoſe, will find his ſteward's influence more extenſive than his own, in the family; becauſe the individuals, who compoſe it, ſee no probability that he ever means to extricate himſelf from bondage. But when once they are convinced, he really intends to diſmiſs his governor, and to do his own buſineſs, the domeſtics will then find it their intereſt to be dutiful; or if they ſhould be ſo far impoſed upon, as to be induced to join in a confederacy, to oppoſe their maſter's intended change, one who gives good wages, need not fear to get a new ſet of ſervants, and therefore can have no reaſon to bear with inſults from the old ones.

The application of this, to the caſe before us, is obvious. Our kings have ſometimes given ſuch unlimited indulgence to their miniſters, that thoſe put into employments, ſcarcely ever looked beyond the miniſters to own an obligation. The natural conſequence of this was, that miniſters employed the influence of the crown to make it ſubmit to themſelves; and having once acquired a number of dependents, purchaſed by doleing out the king's bounty, they had the inſolence to urge the number of their dependents, as a reaſon why the king ſhould bow to their miniſterial omnipotence. — A prince who can be intimidated by the cabals of thoſe who derive all their importance and influence from the unlimited diſpoſal they have had of his favours, ſcarcely deſerves pity, becauſe he has the means of liberty, but wants ſpirit to aſſert it. Let him once ſhew that he is determined to be looked upon as maſter, and he will ſoon feel he will

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be reſpected as ſuch: and if any over-grown miniſter ſhould think this an encroachment on his office, and begin to ſhew his inclination to diſtreſs government, which he no longer can manage without controul, he will ſoon find that his ſuppoſed friends were only the friends of his power, and will continue firm to him no longer than while he has poſſeſſion of the means of gratifying them. In the age we live in there are but few individuals, I am ſure there are but few retainers of a court, ſo little attentive to their own intereſt, as to forget that the crown is permanent, and adminiſtrations temporary; that a king is ſuch all the days of his life, and that miniſters exiſt only by his pleaſure. To ſuppoſe, therefore, that a diſcarded leader of party, ſhould find his Myrmidons willing to continue faithful to his ſtandard, when it is ſet up in oppoſition to that of the king, is to ſuppoſe them capable of a conduct to which their leader himſelf muſt know they are entire ſtrangers.

The reader will readily ſuppoſe that theſe reflexions are made without a view to *particular facts*, or without a ſuſpicion that any miniſterial cabals are now forming againſt the crown; and that they are thrown out here only to ſhew, in caſe ſuch cabals ſhould be formed, at any future period, that they never can be formidable to a prince, who knows the extent of his own importance, and is reſolved not to ſacrifice it to the ambition of a few ſubjects.

Indeed, in one caſe, and in one caſe only, can the ſovereign of this country, ever fear the reſentment of a diſguſted miniſter, or of a diſcarded party; and that is, when a plauſible pretence for oppoſition can be taken up, and the bulk of the nation induced to intereſt itſelf in it, and to believe that it was formed by the leaders of it, not on account of their diſappointments in the ſtruggle for power, but on account of their honeſt diſapprobation of the public plan of government.——But I think I may venture to give it as my opinion, that, were it poſſible to conceive

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there could be, at preſent, an intention in any combination of men to oppoſe government, they could not find ſuch a pretence for oppoſition, as they could lay hold of with any appearance of decency, or hopes of ſucceſs.

When I ſay this, I am not ignorant of the public diſtreſſes, and of the uneaſineſs every real *patriot* muſt feel, and expreſs, when he ſees this poor country bleeding at every vein; borrowing annually twelve millions, and ſpending at leaſt, twenty! already incumbered with a debt of one hundred and twenty millions! and this amazing load ſtill daily increaſing! —When the lover of his country reflects coolly on this its preſent ſituation, the moſt melancholy reflections muſt ſucceed to the exultation of conqueſt. But whither will theſe reflections lead him? Not ſurely to charge our diſtreſſes to his majeſty's account, who found us in ſuch a ſtate, that we cannot retreat from our enormous expences, without ignominy, though God knows, how long we may be able to perſevere in them!

If then the diſtreſſes of the public furniſh no object, at preſent, for the oppoſition of the patriot, who has had no ſhare in promoting the meaſures that have ſo involved us, much leſs can they be made a handle to inflame the nation, by any of thoſe who were in power in the late reign. Can ſuch a perſon, in caſe he ſhould fail in acquiring that ſhare of influence in the cabinet, he formerly might have, ſtand up, with any conſiſtency of character, to throw the firſt ſtone at meaſures, entered into during his own adminiſtration, and for which himſelf and his aſſociates were anſwerable? Could it be borne to hear him expatiate on the immenſe increaſe of the national debt; on the too great ſhare we have taken in the continental war, and on the glaring want of oeconomy with which it has been conducted?——No, the honeſt, the independant part of the nation (the only part of it that government can wiſh to pleaſe, or fear

to diſoblige) would be able to trace, under this veil of patriotiſm, the real character of diſappointed ambition; and would diſregard the barking of this ſtate *Cerberus*, whoſe mouth they know, can, at any time, be ſtopt, by throwing him his ſop.

But I ſtate a caſe which I am confident will not happen. For though we had not a ſufficient ſecurity from the experience we have had of the diſintereſted loyalty of thoſe who have of late been accuſtomed to power, that they are incapable of engaging in any combinations to diſtreſs government, there could not be the leaſt reaſon to ſuſpect that any of them could be ſo *imprudent*, as to attempt it, at a time, when they muſt be conſcious they ſtand greatly in need of the protection of the crown, that their former adminiſtration may not be remembered to their diſadvantage. In a word, ſhould ill informed patriotiſm, or mercenary ambition, ever think of charging on this reign the bloodſhed which may enſue, and the additional millions of debt, which the preſent war may ſtill make neceſſary, his majeſty may well be defended by ſaying, that he ſuffers from the diſmal conſequences of meaſures entered into by former adminiſtrations; and the words of Shakeſpeare may well be applied on this occaſion:

Shake not thy gorey locks at me,
Thou canſt not ſay that I did it.

As I cannot figure to myſelf a more unhappy ſituation than that of a prince, who, with all the abilities requiſite for his ſtation, and with all the inclination to ſupport his own virtuous principles, and his independence, finds himſelf reduced to the mortifying neceſſity of ſubmitting to be dictated to by a cabal of ambitious ſubjects, it is with ſingular pleaſure I have been able to remark, that the circumſtances, under which his majeſty begins his reign, give us a proſpect, that no ariſtocratic uſurpations will be attempted, or

if

if they were attempted, that they would prove as unſucceſsful, as they are odious.

But however flattering theſe circumſtances are, it is not impoſſible that unconſtitutional reſtraints on majeſty, may again be attempted by aſſociated miniſters. It will not therefore, be unſeaſonable, to look back a little to thoſe times, when we know government was engroſſed by ſuch ambitious leaders of party; and without exaggerating their inſolence, and the fatal conſequences which the public felt from their plan of adminiſtration, we ſhall be able to draw ſuch a picture of it, as will ſtrike every lover of his king and country with indignation, and make us unite with heart and hand to prevent its revival.

I ſhall conſider the reign of confederated ſtateſmen in two lights; firſt, as it offered perſonal indignities to the king; and ſecondly, as it naturally gave birth to ſuch arts of government as were ſubverſive of public liberty, and deſtructive of the conſtitution.—The hiſtory of this country, in times not very remote, will enable me, alas! to give but too many melancholy proofs of each of the above particulars.

Though the plan of fettering majeſty in the chains of party, was at leaſt coeval with the *acceſſion* of the royal family; miniſters, at firſt, could not gueſs how far they might venture to puſh their uſurped influence. Our hiſtory, ſince the times of the *barons*, had furniſhed few or no inſtances of *oligarchical* reſtraint put upon the crown; it required time and experience, therefore, to model this new ſyſtem of modern politics. And ſurely nothing but experience could have proved it to be poſſible, that a time ſhould ever happen, when the dignity of the king could be trampled upon without regard to decency; and when miniſters might preſume to carry their inſolence ſo far as to ſet their maſter at defiance, and to govern in ſpite of him.——I need not enter into many particulars, to enable my readers to gueſs, to what period of our hiſtory I now allude.

The

The court caſuiſts in the reign of *Charles* I. in order to prevail upon him to paſs the attainder of lord *Strafford*, found out a curious diſtinction between his private conſcience, as a man, and his public one, as a king. Some miniſters, in a more modern reign, ſeem to have taken the hint from this; when they practiſed a doctrine, which ſhewed it to be their reſolution, that the king ſhould be forced, in the moſt indecent manner, to diveſt himſelf of the feelings of a man; and in order to have the ambition of a few ſubjects gratified, ſhould not be permitted to reſent perſonal inſults, and indignities.

What ſhould we think of ſoldiers who threaten their general to abandon his ſtandards, when the enemy is in ſight, mutinying not for want of pay, but in hopes to extort from him unreaſonable gratifications? What opinion could we have of a crew of ſailors, who, when their ſhip was in danger of ſinking, ſhould refuſe to ſtand to the pump, and threaten to go off in the long-boat, unleſs the maſter ſhould ſubmit to be put in irons, and allow them to divide the cargo? or to uſe an illuſtration perhaps ſtill more ſimilar to the tranſaction now alluded to, what notion could we have of the characters of a ſet of domeſtics, who, in order to force an indulgent maſter to ſubmit to them, ſhould inſiſt on his diſmiſſing every friend from his houſe; require him to take into his family ſome of their own dependents, who had perſonally uſed him ill, and whoſe preſence might be neceſſary to aſſiſt them in enſlaving him; and finding him averſe to compliance, ſhould take occaſion, when they ſaw his houſe on fire, to threaten, in a body, they would abandon him, at that dangerous conjuncture, unleſs he yielded immediately to all their inſolent demands? ——The queſtions I now ſtate, but faintly deſcribe the odious circumſtances of an *aſſociation* of miniſters, within the memory of many, but exactly when, I won't ſay, who finding that, though they had forced their ſovereign to ſubmit to many mortifying indig-

nities and galling conceſſions, he had too delicate a ſenſe of honour not to make reſiſtance againſt ſome of their demands, had recourſe to an act of factious inſolence, of which no preceding part of our hiſtory furniſhed an example. For, at a time when every honeſt ſubject ought to have had full employment in ſoothing the diſtreſſes of majeſty, and in defending the tottering throne; when faction ſhould have ſuſpended its ambitious intrigues, to oppoſe daring diſaffection, and too ſucceſsful rebellion; at that very inſtant the nation ſaw with amazement a *formal confederacy* entered into by the king's ſervants, aſſociating to reſign, in a body, in hopes that their unhappy ſovereign, alarmed to be abandoned, at ſuch a criſis of public danger, might be induced to comply with every demand of their inſolent ambition, which, hitherto, he had refuſed to gratify.

If my memory fails me not, it was not much above a week after a ſecond victory gained over the king's forces by the rebels, that this rebellion in the cabinet broke out; a rebellion which impartial poſterity will, perhaps, look upon as equally *unnatural* with that of the rebel lords, who were then in arms againſt the crown, whoſe open treaſons could ſcarcely exceed in guilt, the ſecret cabals of the *aſſociated band of miniſters*, who, by their conduct on this occaſion, convinced the world that it was the principal article in their political creed, that they had a right to force the king to conſtitute them his council of regency, and that the throne was not to be ſupported, unleſs the prince who ſat upon it conſented to bear their yoke.

Happy had it been for the prince, on whoſe independence this amazing attempt was made; happy had it been for the public if he had thrown himſelf upon his parliament then ſitting, for protection againſt the inſolence of a ſet of men, whom he had gratified with power, loaded with riches, and inveſted with honors! Had he done this, powerful as the con-

confederacy might think themſelves, the Engliſh generoſity would have fired; the cauſe of injured majeſty would have become the cauſe of a loyal public; and thoſe miniſters, whoſe undutifulneſs had only riſen from exceſſive indulgence, would have learnt, that a king of England need only *feel* his own conſequence to make thoſe feel it who inſult him.

The tranſaction above referred to is pregnant with ſo many odious circumſtances, that I ſhould have been glad, for the honour of our country, to have drawn a veil over it. But my argument naturally led me to take notice of it; and every candid reader muſt admit that I have touched the wound with the gentleſt hand; and with the ſingle and honeſt intention of warning every future confederacy of party leaders, to avoid ſuch perſonal inſults on the ſovereign, as *hiſtory* muſt relate with ſevere animadverſion, *patriotiſm* read with indignation, and *candor* itſelf can ſcarcely endeavor to extenuate. It was the faſhion of the times we have been ſpeaking of, to uſe ſuch factious methods of acquiring and preſerving the power; and much is to be ſaid to leſſen the guilt of thoſe who are linked with a party, and bound, as it were, in honor (at leaſt thinking themſelves ſo) to attempt things as an aggregate body, which, as individuals, they perhaps diſapproved of, at the very time, and which, certainly, they could not but condemn, as ſoon as the violence of party zeal ſubſided, and cool reflexion was permitted to operate on probity and good ſenſe.

If miniſterial combinations to engroſs power, and to invade the cloſet, have produced ſuch perſonal inſults on the *king*, the conſequences of ſuch attempts, with regard to the public, were equally odious. For truth obliges me to confeſs, that however favorable to national freedom the true genuine principles of *whiggiſm* be, ſome individuals of that denomination, (who, in times happily at an end, got poſſeſſion of

the royal family) were the great promoters, if not the firſt introducers of ſuch a plan of wicked policy, as had a natural tendency to ſap the firm foundation of Britiſh liberty, and to deſtroy the independence of the conſtitution.

The charge I now bring may ſeem ſevere; but the facts, on which it is built, are notorious. — Such is the happy diſtribution of ſupreme power in this country, that the ſovereign finds it his intereſt to purſue no meaſures but ſuch as are agreeable to the repreſentatives of the people; and the neceſſity of obtaining parliamentary concurrence has increaſed ſince the revolution; from which period, by ſeparating the civil liſt from the other charges of government, annual ſeſſions muſt be held, and annual ſupplies granted. Miniſters, therefore, who wanted to force themſelves into employments at court, ſaw that they ſhould gain their point, if they could convince the ſovereign that they had the power over parliament. But how could any particular ſet of men acquire ſuch a power? It was impoſſible that the whole body of the people, in this great country, ſhould concur in enſlaving their ſovereign and themſelves, to any junto of their fellow-ſubjects; and it was obvious that a parliament *choſen freely*, and compoſed of gentlemen of real property, whoſe inclination it would be to *vote freely*, were not likely to act the deſpicable part of tools to a narrow party-cabal of ambitious courtiers.

In this ſituation, therefore, there was no alternative; the ſcheme of putting the ſovereign into the leading-ſtrings of party muſt be abandoned, or elſe ſuch methods put in practice, as might check the freedom of election, and procure ſuch a parliament as might ſupport a particular ſet of miniſters. The real diſaffection that exiſted at the acceſſion of George the Firſt, furniſhed thoſe who then got poſſeſſion of the cloſet, with a ſpecious pretence to employ ſecretly the court influence upon certain important occaſions; and having once prevailed upon the king to look upon

ſuch

ſuch *ſecret* influence, as neceſſary for the ſecurity of his family, they knew it would anſwer a more immediate purpoſe to themſelves, by giving them the means of perpetuating their own power; a point, in their opinion, not too dearly purchaſed, by a moſt enormous expence of public money *, and by eſtabliſhing venality and corruption into a ſyſtem, as neceſſary engines of government.

To conſider the Engliſh conſtitution in theory, its ſtability would be ſuppoſed to ariſe from parliament. But parliaments, when once they become appendages of adminiſtration, muſt open the wideſt door to ſlavery. In this caſe, they become a mere *ſtate engine* in the hands of the miniſter, to *ſtamp* a value on the baſeſt metal, and to give every bad meaſure the ſanction of national conſent. And no chains are ſo heavy as thoſe which we put on ourſelves; for we ſhall bear from our repreſentatives, what prerogative, openly exerted, never will venture to put in practice.

Happy is it for the conſtitution, that ſuch overruling influence over parliaments has ceaſed! Had the ſyſtem of modelling them, by miniſterial liſts, and miniſterial interpoſition continued, parliaments, by degrees, would have loſt their dignity. The landed gentlemen would have found it impoſſible to get ſeats; and brokers from Change Alley (who pay no taxes for their money) and placemen from the treaſury (for whoſe benefit taxes are paid) would have in time, had the honor of paſſing votes to lay annual burthens on the landed property, in which they themſelves are but little concerned. And if ever this time had arrived, every lover of his country would have wiſhed to ſee an end put to thoſe very aſſemblies, which by keeping

* From 1707 to 1717, the whole amount of the money iſſued on account of the ſecret ſervices, was only 337960 l. 4s. 5d. But, from 1731 to 1741, the ſame number of years, how amazingly it increaſed? For, within this laſt period, there was iſſued, under the ſame head, 1453400 l. 6s. See the report of the ſecret committee.

up the empty forms of the conſtitution, would only have haſtened the loſs of real liberty; and verified the wiſe obſervation, that England never can be undone but by a parliament.

If the reign of monopolizing ſtateſmen be deſtructive of liberty, and of the independence of parliament, no wonder that it ſhould be attended with other collateral miſchiefs. In ſuch times, we need not be ſurprized if the true intereſts of the kingdom, with regard to foreign affairs, be neglected, by thoſe who look upon every object as ſubordinate to that of perpetuating their own power. And, with regard to domeſtic policy, there can be but little chance to ſee much attention to what is *right* in a public view, when private intereſt is the avowed principle of thoſe who have power. Through every department of government, thoſe perſons only will be preferred, who are moſt likely to do the miniſter's buſineſs, without regarding how unfit they are to be truſted with that of the nation. The favors of power will be proſtituted to the moſt profligate; and it will be the ſum of all merit, to have intereſt in ſome borough, or to be related to thoſe who have. — In a word, the ſpirit, the morals, the religion, the reputation, and importance of the nation will decay, and the *body politic* droop under univerſal *corruption*.

Surely I ſhall be pardoned for the warmth with which I have expreſſed myſelf, in ſpeaking of the times when government was ſeized upon by a confederacy of miniſters; and every friend of monarchy, every lover of liberty, every one not bred up in the ſchool of miniſterial corruption, will heartily join me, in my ardent wiſhes to ſee this ſyſtem for ever exploded; in a word, to ſee his majeſty lay hold of the uncommon advantages, with which, as we have obſerved above, he aſcends the throne, to keep himſelf free from its dominion.

But why ſhould I content myſelf with expreſſing my wiſhes on this head? — We can already appeal to facts

facts which give us well-grounded hopes, that the ſovereign now upon the throne will adopt thoſe principles, which appear ſo neceſſary, to make his reign glorious, and his people happy.

Here then let me congratulate my fellow-ſubjects, on the pleaſing proſpects which already open to our view. In this infancy of his majeſty's government, he hath conducted himſelf, in ſuch a manner, as gives us juſt grounds to form the higheſt ideas, both of his good diſpoſitions and of his abilities; to expect that this will be a reign of dignity and importance, a reign in which the miniſters will depend on the crown, and not the crown on the miniſters; in ſhort, a reign in which the hateful and worn-out diſtinctions of party will be aboliſhed, and government carried on, without having recourſe to the miſchievous arts of corruption, and without reviving the odious tyranny of miniſterial dictators.

Such hath been the inſolence of former adminiſtrations, that a king of England hath frequently ſeen himſelf unable to confer the ſmalleſt employment, unleſs on the recommendation, and with the conſent of his *miniſters*. If I may be allowed to credit *ſome* facts, which every one of my readers muſt have heard, —it ſhould ſeem that the long-wiſhed for time is come, when ſubjects may expect to receive favors from the crown, without owing the obligation to all-directing miniſters.

But it is not merely from this circumſtance, that we hope for a new *æra*; for we ſee that his majeſty is reſolved to put himſelf at the head of all his ſubjects, by aboliſhing all the diſtinctions of party, by accepting with paternal affection the aſſiſtance of *every honeſt man*, to ſupport the throne; and, as a mark of his royal confidence, placing in the moſt honorable ſtations, near his own perſon, ſome, who have not ſurely owed their places to miniſterial importunity, becauſe they have always oppoſed miniſterial influence.

The circumſtances attending this moſt important meaſure give us room to hope for the moſt flattering conſequences. Some few of the *proſcribed party*, have, indeed, in former reigns, been put into employment; but, though individuals were gratified, the party ſtill remained in oppoſition. Now, every thing is different. Thoſe of that denomination now taken into employment, are followed by the whole body of their friends to the royal preſence, where they mix, unplaced and unpenſioned, with the numerous throng of dutiful ſubjects, and give us juſt reaſon to exult with Shakeſpear, that

England never did, and never ſhall
Lye at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it did firſt help to wound itſelf.
Now theſe her princes *are come home again,*
Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we ſhall ſhock them.

But, has not this very meaſure given an alarm? Has it not been thought a hardſhip on thoſe who have been enriched with all the rewards of government, theſe fifty years, to have ſo much as one employment given away, from their party? This language, we are certain, cannot be held amongſt miniſters themſelves, though it may be faſhionable amongſt their humble dependents, who have always the *loaves and fiſhes in their eye.* But I would recommend it to ſuch gentlemen, to moderate their reſentment on this occaſion. For it is ten to one, that if they ſhew it any where, but in their own private *juntos*, they may be addreſſed in the words of Horace;

Luſiſti ſatis; ediſti ſatis, atque bibiſti:
Tempus abire tibi eſt; ——

You have rioted long enough, gentlemen, at the expence of the public; you have had places and penſions,

ſions, and jobs, and contracts, and ſubſcriptions, in abundance: — it is time now for you to think you have had your full ſhare of lucre, and to make room for others who have been fleeced to gorge you with plunder.

It is ſcarcely poſſible to avoid being ludicrous when we take notice of the inſolent pretenſions and complaints of the mob of placemen (for their leaders do not ſurely join in the cry) on the alarm that the bottom of government is to be widened. I wiſh ſome body would take the trouble of making a computation how much money has been received by a placeman who has, we will ſuppoſe, a ſalary of three thouſand pounds a year, and then ſet it againſt the money that has been paid by a country gentleman, for the ſame number of years, as taxes on an eſtate of the ſame value; and then ſee whether it can be borne, that the ſame perſons ſhould be conſtantly continued in employment, while all equally offer their ſervice. I am but very aukward at ſuch computations, but I think it will not be difficult to ballance accounts between the placeman and country gentleman. — I have heard, above twenty years ago, that a proprietor of land paid above thirteen ſhillings *per* pound in taxes to the public. The many additional loads laid upon us ſince that time, induce me to think that, at preſent, he pays full fifteen ſhillings. Nor will this computation be thought very wide from the mark, by any one who will reflect, that beſides reckoning the heavy ſums paid in hard money, we include in this calculation, the endleſs variety of taxes that raiſe the price of every convenience, nay, of every neceſſary of life, and encreaſe our expence inſenſibly, in every article we have occaſion to purchaſe. — If we proceed then, upon this foundation, we ſhall find that a country gentleman, with a rent-roll of 3000 l. *per an.* will have paid in taxes, in the courſe of twenty years, at leaſt *forty five thouſand pounds:* while a placeman, who is paid 3000 l. *per annum*, as a ſalary, during the ſame period, will have

put

put into his pocket, *ſixty thouſand pounds* of the public money. Can there be equity in ſuch glaring inequality? And can it be ſtrange, that there ſhould be uneaſineſſes and diſcontents in the kingdom, while the many are *impoveriſhed*, to enrich the few? A prince therefore cannot begin his reign with a more endearing meaſure, than to ſatisfy the body of his faithful ſubjects, whoſe burthens are ſo grievous, that no particular ſet of men is to expect to be exempted from feeling the weight of them; while others equally worthy of his protection, are doomed to be *hewers of wood*, and *drawers of water*, with nothing to boaſt of, but the comfortable employment of paying exorbitant taxes: taxes! too great a part of the amount of which, they have ſeen employed to carry on that ſyſtem of monopoly, by which they themſelves were oppreſſed, and to furniſh the means of luxury and profuſion to their oppreſſors.

When the private intereſt of a few individuals is affected, we frequently ſee that they have art enough to get their cauſe to be looked upon as the cauſe of a whole party. I ſhould be ſorry if this happened to be the caſe at preſent; and yet, we have been told, that, becauſe a few *tories* have got places, attempts have been made to induce the *whigs* to conſider this as an attack on their whole body: but if the *whigs* can be ſo far deluded as to believe this, it will give us a remarkable proof, that *party is the madneſs of the many, for the gain of the few.* For does any candid and intelligent man ſeriouſly believe, that at this time of day, there ſubſiſts any party diſtinction amongſt us, that is not merely nominal? Are not the *tories* friends of the *royal family?* Have they not long ago laid aſide their averſion to the diſſenters? Do they not think the toleration and eſtabliſhment, both neceſſary parts of the conſtitution? And can a *whig* diſtinguiſh theſe from his own principles? Muſt not, therefore, every honeſt man ſee and confeſs, that the cry againſt widening the bottom of government, is

propagated

propagated by ſome, who, finding their own views of ambition or gain affected by this meaſure, endeavor to render it odious amongſt the body of the party, who otherwiſe would have ſeen no reaſon to be alarmed, even in point of private intereſt? For all that the *tories* poſſibly can hope for, or expect, is that a few marks of confidence may be given them at preſent, as a proof, that the *proſcription* is at an end, and as an earneſt, that in the future diſpoſal of court favors, when there are vacancies by deaths and not by removals, they will ſtand an equal chance of being taken notice of, with the reſt of his majeſty's good ſubjects. And here I may aſk, has ſo much as a ſingle *whig* been diſplaced, to make room for a *tory* ſucceſſor? Have not the few places conferred on the formerly excluded party, been ſuch as his majeſty has created, in his own bed-chamber, by increaſing the number of his ſervants? Why therefore ſhould there be complaints, where there is ſo little foundation? Indeed, the thing ſpeaks for itſelf. The ground of the uneaſineſs is not that any *whig* has been diſplaced, but that a nation of *whigs*, as we may now juſtly be called, muſt ceaſe for the future to be governed by the narrow maxims of faction.

If it muſt give every friend of the *royal family* a ſincere ſatisfaction, to ſee the *proſcription* of the *tories* ended; there is another equally pleaſing proſpect now opened to our view,—we may hope, that the days of undue influence over *parliaments* never can be *revived.*

The original pretence for iſſuing money for purpoſes not publicly avowed, was to prevent the *jacobite* party from prevailing in their elections: but the extinction of *jacobitiſm* has put an end to that pretence.

If money were to be iſſued at preſent, for the purpoſes we ſpeak of, whom could it be employed againſt?—Againſt gentlemen who have given convincing

vincing proofs of their loyalty to the preſent royal family; have heartily concurred to ſupport government in parliament, and have offered their ſervices at court, in the preſent reign, which ſervices his majeſty has been pleaſed to accept. And ſhall it be ſuppoſed, that gentlemen who have been thought worthy by the king, to be placed in the moſt honorable ſtations in his family, ſhould be oppoſed by the miniſters, as unworthy to be admitted into parliament?——The ſuppoſition is highly abſurd; and, therefore, I muſt beg leave to expreſs my diſbelief of a report, very current, *that when a great perſonage was applied to, to know how much money ſhould be iſſued, for a certain important purpoſe*, his anſwer was, *Not a farthing*.

I make no doubt, ſuch an application would have met with ſuch an anſwer; but, I cannot believe the application was ever made, and am inclined to think, that the report muſt have been raiſed by ſome enemy of the great miniſter who has the direction of money matters. For to ſuppoſe that the *corruption* of former days ſhould be revived, when the reaſon given for its being firſt introduced has entirely ceaſed, would, in effect, be to tell us, that we are never more to have an independent parliament. If at ſuch a time as this, when the only contention throughout the kingdom, is, who ſhall give the ſtrongeſt proofs of attachment to the king, the people of England are not thought fit to be truſted with the free exerciſe of their right to chooſe their repreſentatives, this would be a public declaration to all the world, that they never ought to be truſted with it, and that *corruption* is to be ingrafted into our conſtitution. But ſurely this doctrine cannot poſſibly be adopted by the great miniſter whoſe name has been made uſe of, on this occaſion. He has by his paſt conduct ſhewn, that he deſerves no ſuch reproach, and we have no reaſon to fear, that one who did not exert an undue miniſterial influence, in chooſing the parliament now ſitting,

ſhould

ſhould have the leaſt intention to exert it at the enſuing election. He has beſides, other things to think of at preſent, more adapted to his office, and to the exigencies of the ſtate; and, inſtead of examining liſts of boroughs, and qualifications of candidates, he will be better employed in examining into the exorbitant contingencies of our German and American commiſſaries and contractors, that there may not be a deficiency of above *four millions*, beſides the *twelve* that are borrowed, for the ſervice of next campaign.

The above reaſons ſeem ſufficient to induce any one to diſbelieve the report of money aſked and refuſed; but I think there may be ſomething *ſtill* ſtronger ſaid on the ſubject.——The miniſter who could propoſe to the crown, at preſent, to employ ſecret-ſervice-money, for domeſtic purpoſes relative to the enſuing election, could not make ſuch a propoſal without betraying a ſecret he had better keep to himſelf.—I mean, that he deſires the *fingering* of the public money, only to ſerve his own private views of ambition. Every candidate throughout the kingdom, at the approaching period, will be the king's friend, and willing to ſupport his government. It is indifferent to the crown who is choſen, whether it be John or Thomas, when both of them are equally good ſubjects. A miniſter, therefore, who ſhould think of employing the money of the crown, at this conjuncture, to oppoſe and ſupport particular candidates, would ſhew plainly that he means not ſo much to do the king's buſineſs, as his own, by increaſing the number of his *own* immediate dependents, and forming a party who may owe their *obligations* to himſelf ſingly, and encourage him to graſp univerſal influence, in ſpite of the royal inclination. Far be it from me to ſuſpect, there can be any miniſters at preſent, who have ſuch views; but I am ſure, if they ſhould deſire to be allowed to employ money for ſecret domeſtic purpoſes, it would look as if they had.

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I am very ſenſible, that there are many well-meaning perſons who ſeem to think, that without *corruption*, there might be danger apprehended from *Democratical* encroachments on prerogative.——But they who are really ſtruck with the above objection, certainly forget that though the wings of *prerogative* have been clipt, the *influence* of the crown is greater than ever it was in any period of our hiſtory. For when we conſider, in how many boroughs the government has the voters at its command; when we conſider the vaſt body of perſons employed in the collection of the revenue in every part of the kingdom; the inconceivable number of placemen, and candidates for places in the *cuſtoms*, in the *exciſe*, in the *poſt office*, in the *dock yards*, in the *ordnance*, in the *ſalt office*, in the *ſtamps*, in the *navy* and *victualing* offices, and in a variety of other departments; when we conſider again the extenſive influence of the *money corporations*, *ſubſcription jobbers*, and *contractors*; the endleſs dependence created by the obligations conferred on the bulk of the gentlemen's families throughout the kingdom, who have relations preferred, or waiting to be preferred, in our *navy*, and numerous *ſtanding army*; when, I ſay, we conſider how wide, how binding a dependence on the crown is created by the above enumerated particulars, no lover of monarchy, need ear any bad conſequences from ſhutting up the Exchequer at elections; eſpecially, when to the endleſs means the crown has of influencing the votes of the *electors*, we add the vaſt number of employments, which the faſhion of the times makes the *elected* deſirous of and for the obtaining which, they muſt depend upon the crown.

But, I believe, I have expreſſed myſelf improperly, when I ſpoke of the influence of the crown; for to ſay the truth, we may have obſerved from experience, that in proportion as the crown had the power of *obliging*, miniſters, by being permitted to aſſume the univerſal direction of all thoſe who had been

obliged,

obliged, have too frequently been enabled to make uſe of the dependents on the crown, to bring it into ſubjection to themſelves; and at the ſame time, while they became formidable to the prince, they have had it in their power to make attempts on the liberties of the people. For when the crown influence lies diſperſed in its ſeveral diſtinct channels; when every placeman, or public officer, is left at full freedom to vote for the candidate he likes beſt; numerous as theſe gentlemen are throughout the kingdom, they never can be ſuppoſed united in any ſcheme to hurt public liberty. But when they are to paſs in muſter before a firſt miniſter; when they are taught to look upon him as their commander in chief, and know that diſobedience to his orders will be conſtrued *mutiny*, and puniſhed as ſuch; when inſtructions are diſpatched by the parliamentary undertaker, to every ſervant of the crown to ſupport and oppoſe particular candidates; when every placeman, from the *exciſeman* and *tide-waiter* up to the *commiſſioner* and *courtier*, has a miniſterial liſt delivered to him; when the influence of the crown, I ſay, is thus moulded into one connected maſs, and truſted to the direction of a ſingle miniſter, What object can be ſtrong enough to reſiſt its force? And how fatally will it operate in deſtroying the independence of parliament, even though the *flood-gate* of *corruption* ſhould be ſtopt?

If the interpoſition of a lord of parliament, in any particular election, be carefully provided againſt (as we know it is by the ſtanding orders of the houſe of commons) as inconſiſtent with the conſtitution, how much more daring an attack is it upon the very eſſence of parliament, to ſee a miniſter preſume to *undertake*, not for one or two members only, in places where he has a natural intereſt, but for hundreds of repreſentatives, in boroughs ſcarcely known to him by name? What notion can any one have of the freedom of elections, if the writs for a new parliament iſſued by the crown, are accompanied by private inſtructions

ſtructions from a miniſter, like ſo many *congé d' elires*, which muſt implicitly be obeyed?

I think it would be no difficult matter to draw a pretty ridiculous repreſentation of a firſt miniſter, iſſuing his orders to the numerous ſtanding army of placemen, and making out a liſt of members for a new parliament: and I would recommend it to Mr. Hogarth, to try his fertile imagination, in a drawing for a *political print* on this ſubject. I would have the *great man*, ſurrounded by all his truſty dependents and clerks, drawn, ſeated at a table, on which ſhould be placed, variety of books and papers, diſtinguiſhed each by its proper label. Here we might read, *liſts of voters* under the *exciſe*, the *cuſtoms*, the *war office*, *&c. &c. liſts* of ſheriffs and returning officers; and exact accounts of the ſtate of *admiralty* boroughs, *navy office* boroughs, *ordnance* boroughs, *cinque port* boroughs, *poſt office* boroughs, *&c. &c.*—Before the *great undertaker* ſhould lie open a liſt of the members laſt choſen, which he is to alter and amend as he thinks proper. In this ſituation, methinks, he will ſeem like ſome author, when his devil has juſt brought him a freſh ſheet from the preſs, to be corrected; and like him too, he writes a *ſtet* againſt ſuch names as he intends to be choſen again; D for a proſcribing *dele*, againſt thoſe he intends to be left out; and Q's, for farther information about others, of whom he has ſome doubts. One of the clerks who attended on ſuch an occaſion, (I am ſure no body can gueſs either at the miniſter or clerk) told me, that there were certain myſterious letters againſt almoſt all the names in the liſt; but the meaning of theſe, he ſaid, he could not explain, but perhaps I might gueſs at them: M. M. was written againſt many of them; againſt others was K. M.; and againſt a great many I. M. This, I own, puzzled me a little at firſt; but, upon conſideration, I decyphered them thus: *ſtet*, it ſeems, was always writ, where *M. M.* was againſt the names; and therefore I concluded thoſe letters muſt mean

miniſtry

miniſtry men, ſuch as would be ſtaunch friends to the great man, in oppoſition to a *greater*, if neceſſary, and be always ready to give as much money as ſhould be deſired, in hopes to have a moderate ſhare of it properly applied, to encourage merit, and reward faithful ſervices.——I could not well explain *K. M.* but ſhould have gueſſed it ſtood for *king's men*, or *members*, if I had not learnt from my friend, that as many of theſe were to be left out at the new election, as with decency could be oppoſed. As for *I. M.* I am pretty ſure, it was meant for *independent members*, a ſtrange ſet of old-faſhioned ruſtics, who bring notions of public ſpirit, oeconomy, and inquiry, with them to parliament, and who, therefore, well deſerved, what I found was the caſe, to have the dreadful *dele* invariably put oppoſite their names.

My informant gave me a ſpecimen of the converſation on this curious occaſion, between the *great man* and his truſty friends. One of them for inſtance, raiſed an objection againſt a certain perſon's name being left in the liſt, ſaying, "It was notoriouſly known that he viſited at a certain great houſe near ———." "Aye, ſays *my lord*, that is true; but he has leave to do ſo; and that rather turns to our account; beſides, he is quartered for 500 *l.* a year, on a *North American* contract."—"Pray what does your lordſhip think of ſir *Thomas Touchit?*"—"Oh, replied *my lord*, he has leave now and then to vote againſt us, and no body knows but myſelf that he has a private penſion.—"*My lord*, (ſays another) *Harry Simple* ſeems to me to be a little ſuſpicious, and far from a ſure man."——"Don't trouble your head about him, replied his *lordſhip*, he is ſafe enough; I ſaved his uncle about ſeven years ago, from being hanged. He was a notorious ſmuggler, is now very rich, and his nephew *Harry* expects to be his heir; beſides he is quartered on a patent-place, in the cuſtoms." "Captain *Wronghead*, ſays *my lord*, I doubt will be diſtreſſed about a qualification; but he will have no

ſcruple to ſwear to ſuch a one, as we can get him; for he is a very honeſt fellow, and will do any thing to ſerve his friends."

But I aſk pardon, for aiming at ridicule, in treating of an encroachment on the conſtitution, which is more properly the object of indignation. Without pretending, therefore, to fix the exact time, and place, when and where, the above miniſterial picture had a real exiſtence, it is with pleaſure I obſerve that ſuch unlimited influence over the electors, who are connected with, and dependent on the crown, cannot be exerted at preſent by any miniſter; becauſe, it muſt then be exerted in direct oppoſition to the declared intention of the *firſt perſonage* in the kingdom, who, we are well aſſured, has abſolutely forbid any of the *public offices* to intermeddle in *elections*.

If the *Roman* generoſity, in proclaiming liberty to the cities of *Greece*, was received with rapture; with equal rapture, may we well ſuppoſe, have the vaſt body of our fellow ſubjects, whoſe ſtations make them dependent on government, received that unexpected emancipation from miniſterial tyranny, which now leaves them at full liberty to vote according to their own ſentiments; places them on a level with the reſt of their free-born countrymen, and frees them from the dread of being thought diſreſpectful to the *throne*, though they ſhould be honeſt enough to diſregard the injunctions of the *treaſury!*

That his majeſty has left the ſervants of the crown in this happy ſtate of independence, with regard to elections, is a fact that ſhould be made known, in every corner of the kingdom. And what miniſter dares attempt to fetter them, in oppoſition to this royal declaration? No ſuch attempt, we may be certain, will be publicly made; and, if there be any private efforts made, to defeat his majeſty's noble views, of reſtoring the independence of the conſtitution, every lover of his country ſhould be watchful to get intelligence of the facts, and to preſerve the proofs

of

of them, that proper examples may be made; and that all the nation may know, that ſubordinate placemen, who refuſe to obey a miniſterial ſummons to vote at *elections*, are in leſs danger of loſing their employments, than the miniſter who ſhall preſume to dictate to them, in oppoſition to the inclination of the king, and in violation of the independence of the conſtitution.

Hiſtory furniſhes us with an inſtance of a people ſo degenerate, as to reject liberty, when offered.——If the inhabitants of *Great Britain* would avoid the infamy of the old *Capadocians*, let the patriotiſm of their generous monarch rouze them from that ſtate of indolent ſecurity, and venal dependence on miniſters, which hath made but too dangerous a breach in the fortreſs of liberty. Their common father calls out to them to ſave themſelves, and if there be any ſpark of public ſpirit left; if they be not more attached to faction than to the conſtitution; if they do not think it of leſs conſequence to preſerve their country free, than to procure to themſelves ſome dirty advantage for linking in party to deſtroy it; if ſuch ſlaviſh and mercenary principles do not conſtitute the character of this nation at preſent; we may now flatter ourſelves, to ſee the almoſt loſt powers of the Britiſh conſtitution reſtored to their original vigour.

Here then it will be natural to aſk, what are thoſe ſteps, which every lover of his country ſhould take, at the enſuing election, that his majeſty's royal intentions may not be defeated?——The anſwer to this queſtion is obvious. Let the country gentlemen, (I mean gentlemen of every denomination, who have connection with landed, fixed property) throughout the kingdom, ſtrenuouſly endeavour to get into parliament; let them exert their natural intereſt, in their reſpective neighbourhoods, and not allow their boroughs to be ſtolen from them, by mean, low people, who come down to them, at the time of election,

with hands full of money, and never ſee or think of them afterwards.

Though the public money is no longer to be employed, in ſupport of *court candidates*, it may well be ſuppoſed, another ſet of oppoſers will ſtart up againſt the country gentlemen. The *monied* men of the metropolis will think this ſtagnation of ſecret ſervice money, a lucky incident to get themſelves choſen; will gladly offer their ſervices to any miniſter; and by advancing each his own money, ſupply, in ſome degree, the want of the uſual fund. But, if the men of property, in every county, would form themſelves into aſſociations, to oppoſe every money-jobber who ſhall attempt to invade their boroughs, theſe *merchant adventurers in politics* would ſoon repent of their electioneering. Loaded as the gentlemen of *England* are, with taxes, and perhaps exhauſted by former ſtruggles at elections, few of them can be ſuppoſed be in ſuch circumſtances, as to engage ſingly with an overgrown *director*, who, inſtead of paying any thing to the public burthens, is annually increaſing his capital, by preying upon the neceſſities of the ſtate. But what no individual is equal to, on his own bottom, ſupported by the joint intereſt, and by a joint purſe of all his neighbours, will eaſily and cheaply be accompliſhed.

If our houſe of commons is to be filled with men who are in trade, and who get themſelves elected, only to be in the way of their trade; the *contracts*, the *jobs*, the *ſubſcriptions*, the *loans*, the *remittances*, &c. &c. with which a miniſter can benefit them, are ſuch a temptation to them, to aſſiſt in involving the nation in dangerous projects, and ruinous expence, that I know not whether we have moſt reaſon to dread a majority of greedy *ſtock-holders*, or of indigent *placemen*, for our repreſentatives. Every one therefore, who wiſhes well to his country, who would hope to ſee a parliament attached to the king and the conſtitution, and not ſubſervient to miniſterial influence and direction,

direction, naturally will turn his eyes on the country gentlemen of *England*, at this critical conjuncture, and call upon them to exert themſelves with vigour, to wreſt the honour of being repreſentatives of the people, from a ſet of men, who either have no *property* at all, or ſuch a ſort of property, as bears no ſhare in the expences of the ſtate.

If the ſhutting up of the exchequer, and the emancipation of placemen, are ſtrong encouragements to the gentlemen of property, and great eſtates, to attempt getting themſelves choſen at the next election, the peculiar ſituation of the kingdom, at this juncture, is another moſt powerful motive, to animate them to the conduct I recommend.

Every great and national object, that can deſerve the attention of the preſent age, and fix the happineſs or miſery of this country, to lateſt poſterity, muſt neceſſarily come under the conſideration of the next parliament.——Diſeaſes in the body politic, equally with thoſe in the natural body, have their criſis; and whoever ſits down to ruminate on the preſent ſtate and ſituation of this kingdom, if he has any ſhare of political ſagacity, will ſee but too much reaſon to conclude, that by a train of meaſures, adopted too long in former times of peace, the conſtitution has been undermined; and by a wantonneſs of expence in former wars, and in the preſent, we are, at laſt, brought almoſt to the very brink of a precipice, which imagination can ſcarcely ſurvey, without horror.

To recover this conſtitution before it be entirely loſt, to inquire into the cauſes of the increaſe of our immenſe debt, and to deviſe means of leſſening it, muſt, therefore, be the great object of the enſuing parliament, otherwiſe ruin and deſtruction will at laſt overtake us.

But can this be a ſeaſon for ſuch inquiries? When all the attention of parliament muſt be confined to furniſh freſh ſums to defray the amazing expence of

a conſuming war, can this be a time to ſet on foot plans of reformation?——No, ſurely;——and while I confeſs the fact, I lament it as an addition to our misfortunes. Till peace be happily reſtored, nothing can be done to ſave the nation; and every day that peace is deferred, will increaſe the difficulty of ſaving it. Like a prodigal heir, who ſpends annually four times more than the real income of his eſtate, we muſt, if our expences continue, at laſt be unable to find ſecurity for a freſh mortgage, or a fund to pay freſh intereſt. In this alarming ſituation, it is the only conſolation to us, that the bravery of our troops by ſea and land, has humbled the power, deſtroyed the trade, and ruined the navy of our enemy; and that though *France* is ſtill too able to cope with us on the continent of *Europe*, with which we are unhappily connected, we may hope from the multiplied deſolations of the poor country, now the ſeat of war, that it will be impoſſible much longer to continue the horrid ſcene of bloodſhed.

It is not therefore an unreaſonable preſumption, that the firſt ſeſſions of a new parliament, inſtead of laying on freſh burthens, and adding to our already intolerable debts, will be more agreeably employed in deliberations concerning the terms of peace.—— With regard to theſe I ſhall only obſerve, that though it will require all the abilities of our ableſt negociators to ſettle the jarring intereſts of the powers at war, we may be confident that the eſſential intereſts of *Great Britain* will be taken care of. Bleſſed with the beſt of princes that ever filled a throne, who, *born and educated amongſt us, and glorying in the name of Briton*, has no object ſo dear to him as the happineſs of his country,——we need not doubt that he will forward the much wiſhed for, and much wanted return of peace; and when once he has extricated the nation from that diſtreſs in which he found us involved, that he will co-operate with an honeſt and independent

independent parliament, to reſtore an almoſt loſt conſtitution.

Aſpice venturo lætantur ut omnia ſæclo!
Jam nova progenies! Virg.

Had the long peace that ſucceeded, from the treaty of Utrecht, to the breaking out of the Spaniſh war in 1738, been properly employed, in leſſening our debts, and reforming abuſes connected with them, we ſhould not, at this time of day, have had any gloomy apprehenſions concerning their conſequences. But, by an uninterrupted courſe of borrowing, a total neglect of paying off, and by a corrupt want of œconomy in ſpending, we have, at laſt, been ſunk into ſuch an abyſs of diſtreſs, that if providence had not raiſed up a prince, who ſcorns and renounces thoſe arts of government, which have been too fatally put in practice, by corrupt adminiſtrations, our conſtitution, nay, our very exiſtence as an independent kingdom, ſeemed verging to annihilation.

An honeſt and independent parliament, ſeconded, nay, rather excited by the patriotiſm and virtue which now adds freſh luſtre to majeſty, will do wonders ſtill towards ſaving us. Should the national debt (at once the cauſe and effect of the languiſhing ſtate of conſtitutional freedom) be ſuffered to remain at its preſent enormous height, we need not be ſurprized if, like a bubble filled with air, it burſt of itſelf, as the *South Sea ſcheme* formerly did. And if this ſhould happen, let any true Engliſhman think what extenſive deſtruction muſt be ſpread over the whole kingdom. Thouſands, nay, millions, muſt be brought to immediate and irremediable ruin. And what rage, what ſlaughter, what anarchy this may occaſion, it is better for us to try to prevent, than to deſcribe. Credit is a thing of ſo delicate a nature, that the leaſt diſtruſt may occaſion the total loſs of it: when that is gone, all ſinks at once with it; but the hand

of the legiſlature, by feeling the pulſe of the nation, may apply ſuch parliamentary remedies, as may ſupport credit, and think of ſome ſcheme for a regular, though ſlow payment, of our debt.

One circumſtance alone is too alarming not to be carefully attended to: foreigners have got a vaſt ſhare of this debt into their hands. Perhaps our amazing loans of late years never could have been filled, had not annual millions of foreign money poured in upon us. But if this has been a temporary relief, and enabled us to go on with the war, think how it will diſtreſs us in time of full peace. If we ſuppoſe foreigners to be in poſſeſſion of thirty millions in our ſtocks, (much of which has been bought in at twenty-five and thirty *per cent.* diſcount) the intereſt of this money will drain the kingdom of perhaps a million and a half every year. And when once it happens, that foreigners draw more from this country for their intereſt in our funds, than we gain from them, by balance of trade, ſhe ſhall be actually in a ſtate of incurable conſumption, and the whole enquiry will be, how long the patient may be able to drag out a miſerable exiſtence.

What ſcheme can poſſibly be deviſed, to leſſen the intolerable burthen, it is not for me to determine; but this every one may foreſee, that much will depend on the future ſtate of our commerce. If by an increaſe of that (an increaſe we may reaſonably hope for, if our America and Weſt India colonies are not checked by French encroachments) the produce of the *ſinking fund* is augmented, the religious, and inviolable application of this annual ſum (without which no plan of payment can ever ſucceed) will, in caſe we be ſo happy as to enjoy a laſting peace, eaſe this poor country of great part of that load under which ſhe now ſinks, and under the weight of which, I fear, it will be impoſſible for it ever to riſe again, to make efforts to ſave itſelf from the

the future attempts of our inveterate and inſidious enemy.

But if the increaſe of commerce, and the religious application of the *ſinking fund*, will be a foundation for deviſing ſome ſcheme of reducing our debt; under ſuch a prince as we now have, and with ſuch a parliament as we now wiſh to have, what may we not alſo expect, by a due attention to national œconomy?—Were a minute enquiry to be made into the unneceſſary expence in collecting our revenue, and into the infinite and abominable abuſes and frauds that are practiſed, in almoſt every branch of it, I make not the leaſt doubt, that ſuch an annual ſaving could be made, as would be of the higheſt conſequence in the preſent diſtreſſed circumſtances of the ſtate. Want of œconomy, and culpable profuſion, will ſoon diſorder the affairs of the richeſt perſon; but one whoſe eſtate is loaded with tenfold mortgages, muſt be a madman, who goes on in a courſe of wanton riot, and ſuffers himſelf to be preyed upon by a ſwarm of unneceſſary, diſhoneſt, and expenſive domeſtics. Were an honeſt parliament to look into the management of our *cuſtom-houſe*, and there to obſerve, that there is ſcarcely a ſingle place that is not executed by deputies, if not by the deputies of deputies; were they to carry on their inquiry through the many offices that have the care of every other part of our income; they would, without aboliſhing one place really uſeful, or diminiſhing one ſalary more than it ought to be, make retrenchments that would, in a courſe of few years, eaſe us of the load of millions.

The ſingle article of unneceſſary penſions, which times of corruption have ſo amazingly increaſed, would be an annual fund, to enable a virtuous monarch, oppreſſed by his greedy courtiers, to lend a moſt effectual aſſiſtance towards the glorious work of ſaving the ſtate. Such have been the faſhion of the times, that penſions have been aſked, for every rea-

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ſon but the ſingle one, for which they ought to be given,—the indigence of the penſioner; nay, they have been increaſed, in proportion as the perſons who obtained them were opulent. To ſuch an unhappy ſtate hath the crown been reduced, that almoſt every *great man*, who is turned out of employment, or who retires from it, though he is maſter of a noble eſtate, and has added to his wealth by his places, thinks he has a right to be put upon the liſt of *penſioners*, and to have thouſands a year ſettled upon him for life. In order to expoſe the abſurdity of all ſuch extravagant profuſion of the public money, conſider how many perſons are rendered miſerable, by this ſeeming piece of good nature? What loads we entail upon our unhappy poſterity, whoſe teeth will be ſet on edge by the ſour grapes their great, great grand-fathers have taſted, to feed one luxurious and expenſive man?—— If the penſion be 4000 l. a year, four thouſand mid-ling families muſt contribute to bear his extravagance: twenty ſhillings a year muſt be continued on 4000 houſes, to enable him to make a birth-day dinner, or to ſtake his thouſands at a Pharoah table. For the future let us denominate penſions, by the name of taxes; and ſay, that my lord ſuch a one runs away with the *fortieth* part of the *ſalt duty*; that another ſpends about *two thirds* a year, out of the tax on *tallow*; and that a third drinks prodigiouſly deep, from the ſevere additional duty on *Porter's ale*.

But beſides deviſing means of payment, an honeſt, and independent parliament will find it incumbent on them, to enquire immediately into the firſt riſe, and the rapid progreſs of our preſent amazingly *multiplied* incumbrances.

If we ſhould take up the conſideration of this important affair, from the year 1716, when the ſinking fund was firſt eſtabliſhed, or from any other later period, we ſhall find that ſcarcely any of the debt which we now groan under, has ever been accounted for; and I fancy it will be extremely difficult ever

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to account for it properly to the public. Not one, perhaps, for many years, of the money-offices, has ever thought of paſſing any account; and a *paymaſter*, who has been dead ſome years, when he was aſked how he intended to paſs ſome intricate accounts, had the honeſty, or rather the effrontery to own, with a ſmile, that he never deſigned they ſhould be paſſed. I wiſh this may not be a principle adopted by our public officers in general, who without fear of inquiry, or cenſure, daily ſuffer moſt amazing ſums to paſs through their hands, which I am ſure can never be accounted for by the regular ways of the Exchequer. How is it poſſible, for inſtance, to produce ſatisfactory vouchers for the incredible amount of our German contingencies? Can the confuſed expences of our Weſt India, and American expeditions, ever be ſufficiently explained? — And ſurely it is highly unreaſonable that privy ſeals ſhould be granted, to indemnify thoſe who are accountable for the expenditure of ſuch ſums; at leaſt till the *chaos* has been brought into ſome order, by parliamentary examination.

But nothing will be more neceſſary, when the honeſt days of ſerious inquiry commence, than to ſift to the bottom the ſtate of the navy accounts. For the management of this branch of our ſervice has been as extravagant, as it is little underſtood. I almoſt bluſh to mention (but the fact is too certain) that in this department particularly, eſtimates ſeem to have been annually laid before parliament, merely for the ſake of form, and without the leaſt intention of adapting the expence of the fleet to the ſupplies aſked and obtained. And this has now been practiſed ſo long, without controul, that parliaments have had but little or nothing left for them to do, with regard to this great article, but to find out funds to anſwer navy debts of *four or five millions*, which, from time to time, they are told have been incurred, by the *fiats* of a navy or victualling board. But the aſſumed authority

thority of ſuch ſubordinate offices, in loading the nation with debts without the knowledge of parliament, is not the only point that requires to be regulated; ſomething muſt be done to introduce œconomy, the want of which, in the affairs of our marine at preſent, we have but too much to lament. Can it be ſurprizing, that our navy debt ſo amazingly increaſes, when we reflect that the public buys its ſtores, it proviſions, hires its tranſports, and makes its contracts, at a monſtrous diſadvantage? Every one in the leaſt acquainted with *the courſe of the navy*, muſt own the truth of this moſt melancholy fact; and, therefore, it will be highly worthy to be enquired into, and to be remedied by a diligient and honeſt *committee*, to whoſe care, we truſt, the enſuing parliament will refer the ſtate of our navy, which of late years hath been ſo copious a ſource of incumbrances. And while ſuch an enquiry will be of infinite uſe, in preventing future unneceſſary expences, in fitting out our fleets, may we not alſo hope it will be of real ſervice to the public, to be able to calculate how many *millions* have been expended to refit our ſhips, ſhattered by braving the ſeaſons, without blocking up the enemy, in the Bay of Biſcay; and to maintain our numerous ſquadrons, ſo long employed *in hedging in the cuckow*, in the river Vilaine.

There is one article in the accounts of the navy, of a very extraordinary nature. If any one will look into them, he will find that very conſiderable ſums remain in the hands of ſeveral *right honourable* gentlemen, who *formerly* have been treaſurers. Theſe ſums, indeed, are ſaid to be retained till they may be able to paſs their accounts, and to pay for the charges of paſſing them. But ought it to be permitted, to lock up for many years, ſo much public money, at a time when we are obliged to pay off one bit of paper with another, and are reduced to the comfortable ſituation of ſending *navy bills* into the market, at a diſcount of

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above ten *per cent?* — Beſides, may I aſk where does that money lye at intereſt? and who is to have the advantage of it? Theſe are queſtions very proper to be aſked; and as I have before taken notice, that it has been uſual to give conſiderable penſions, to every one turned out of employment, I hope that, at leaſt, *treaſurers of the navy*, who have perhaps fifteen or twenty thouſand pounds of public money circulating in Change Alley, or fixed in mortgages, for many years after they have ceaſed to have the place, will be thought to have no claim to the king's bounty as penſioners. — Happy had it been for this country, if all our public officers had been animated by the ſame diſintereſted ſpirit, which has diſtinguiſhed, in ſo remarkable a manner, the character of one gentleman, who once enjoyed the employment we now ſpeak of! who quitted it, perhaps from a miſtaken, but certainly from a generous delicacy of ſentiment, worthier of praiſe than of imitation; and whom we now ſee retiring from the ſenatorial *chair* he has filled with ſo much dignity, for above thirty years, like another *Cincinnatus*; ſuperior to the glare of proffered titles; rich in the applauſe of every honeſt man, and in the pleaſing feelings of ſelf-approbation, — a reward that the patriot alone can enjoy, and which accumulated treaſures cannot purchaſe.

The ſums retained by ſome late treaſurers of the navy (on whom, however, I mean to throw no particular blame) call to my mind another article very little known, and hardly underſtood. I mean the ſtate of the money due to the *marines*, who ſerved during the laſt war. No account of this has been given, I think, ever ſince 1746. What then is become of the money? It is well known it has been iſſued by parliament, — and it is as well known that the poor officers and men, of the reſpective regiments, have never received it. — If they could not make up their regimental accounts in form, were not ſuch perſons the proper objects

objects to be aſſiſted by privy ſeals ? Or if *they* were not to be ſo much favored, why, after ſo many years, has not the money in queſtion been applied to the public ſervice, and not left in the hands of a few griping agents and ſecretaries, who have but too many other means of preying on the public ?

But, before the miſerable condition of our finances can be effectually inquired into, beſides appointment of *ſelect*, nay *ſecret committees* in the houſe of commons, the public flatters itſelf, that the wiſdom of the legiſlature will go farther, and erect, by act of parliament, a *commiſſion for taking and ſtating the public accounts:* the commiſſioners to be choſen from amongſt the greateſt and ableſt men of the kingdom, of both houſes, or otherwiſe ; to continue for years together (if it ſhould be neceſſary) to ſit where, and at what time they pleaſe ; aſſiſted by the ableſt clerks they can find ; and veſted with unlimited power over all the public offices ; to ſcrutinize into all the money tranſactions that have paſſed of late years ; to make reports, from time to time, to parliament, of the progreſs they may make in cleanſing the *Augæan ſtable*, and to call for parliamentary cenſures, if neceſſary. The public debt is a wound that muſt be probed to the bottom : not with a furious and malicious intent to ſearch for, and to find out delinquents, but with an honeſt view, to ſave a ſinking conſtitution, and the liberties of this country. But if any delinquents ſhould be found out, though I could wiſh every thing was done with as little ſeverity as poſſible, ſurely it is better that ſome few of the moſt culpable ſhould be ſingled out, as they ought to be, rather than that the nation, by a general bankruptcy, ſhould be thrown into a moſt calamitous deſolation. And may we not reaſonably hope that an inſtance or two, of ſevere animadverſion on domeſtic miſmanagements will, for the future, imprint this important leſſon on the mind of every one, whoſe office makes him accountable to

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the ſtate, that no connections are ſtrong enough to ſcreen *corruption*, and that *public robbery* is as dangerous as it is criminal ?

And now, after enumerating the above particulars which have occurred to me, on taking a curſory view of our preſent ſituation, it cannot ſurely be neceſſary, before I conclude, to mention any more facts (though many more might be mentioned) to convince my readers, how little is known of the real application of the immenſe ſums voted of late years by parliament; and how neceſſary it will be to have a day of parliamentary reckoning for all theſe matters. The diſtreſſes of the ſtate point it out: the voice of the nation loudly demands it; and, what is moſt conſiderable, we have a ſovereign, who renounces the mean arts of venal adminiſtration, by which alone the much wiſhed for inquiry, can be obſtructed.——Motions for reforming any abuſe, or redreſſing any grievance, will ſtand but little chance of ſucceeding, if oppoſed by the crown. But when the firſt advances towards this reformation, when the firſt ſteps towards this redreſs are made voluntarily by the crown, nothing remains to inſure their ſucceſs, but ſuch a conduct in the people, as may ſhew, that they are not altogether unworthy of ſuch a prince, and of ſuch valuable privileges, as he calls upon them to preſerve.

Let every *honeſt man*, therefore, exert himſelf at the approaching elections, that a parliament may be choſen of *honeſt men*; of men of independent fortunes, but loyal principles; men, whoſe inclination it may be to ſupport the throne and the conſtitution, againſt miniſterial inſolence, and corrupt adminiſtration. And, if the landed gentlemen of *England* do their duty, on this important occaſion; if they improve, as they ought to do, the advantages ſo generouſly offered to them, by the check given to the undue influence of government; corrupted as the morals of the electors, in too many of our boroughs are, by a long habit of pro-

proſtitution, there is a fair and reaſonable proſpect, that we may, upon the whole, ſee ſuch an aſſembly of repreſentatives, as will co-operate with his majeſty, in carrying his gracious purpoſes into execution.

I know too well, that there is not wanting amongſt us, a ſet of men who affect to ridicule every attempt to reform the nation, and to reſtore the conſtitution, as a wild *Eutopian* ſcheme, and impoſſible to be put in practice; nay, who (as far as they dare venture to do it) try to render all amiable and virtuous inclinations contemptible, even in the *higheſt perſon*, where they are moſt eminently conſpicuous.—If candidates of this ſort offer themſelves to repreſent us, we cannot ſurely be ſo infatuated as to delegate to them a truſt, which, we may be certain, they mean to betray. By truſting men of ſuch profligate principles, on former occaſions, the foundations of our preſent diſtreſs were laid; and *repreſentatives* of a different character muſt now be choſen, if we would ever hope to emerge, from the dregs of *corruption*, into virtuous *liberty*, and conſtitutional *independence*.

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